A Long Hope: Democracy is Not Coming to Myanmar Anytime Soon
Penulis: Trystanto
The political crisis in Myanmar has nearly entered its fifth long month. To date, according to data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, there are more than 5.000 political prisoners in Myanmar. International attempts to resolve the crisis have, at best, failed to stop the violent junta. At first, many in Myanmar hoped that the international world would save them from the junta. When that hope subsides, the people in Myanmar started joining rebel groups to fight the junta (Myint-U, 2021, pp.140–141). Professional workers have started to conduct civil disobedience protests in an attempt to paralyze the state bureaucracy and other critical sectors, most notably health. The hope is that the junta would be unable to perform effectively and give in to the demands of the protesters (Bociaga, 2021). This, however, is just a pipe dream at best. In this essay, I argue that the junta can function and hold on to power for a long time with very few Burmese people supporting it due to the small size of the junta’s essential coalition and the natural resources of Myanmar.
De Mesquita and Smith (2012, ch.1) theorize that all state leaders, democratic or authoritarian, inherently have one interest: to stay in power. As they cannot rule alone, they depend on a coalition to support the leader and in turn, the leader would give the coalition rewards, be it public or private. There are three stratums of political support present in dictatorships and democracies. The first, called interchangeables, are those who, in theory and legally, have any say on who the leader should be. In Indonesia, the interchangeables are those who are registered to vote in the elections. The second stratum, called influentials, are those who in reality choose the leader. In China, the influentials would be all voting members of the Communist Party. In Indonesia, the influential would be all who actually vote in the elections. Finally, the essentials are those whose support are absolutely critical for the leader’s survival. Without their support, the leader is finished. In Indonesia, the essentials would be the 50%+1 number of votes that are needed to win the election. In the USSR, the essentials would be the committee that chooses the next Secretary-General of the Communist Party and those that could depose the incumbent leader.
Alas, all state leaders would have to reward their essential coalition (Ibid, ch.2). If the coalition is big, then the leader would have to resort to public rewards (e.g. infrastructure, social security, etc.) as it is more efficient. If the essential coalition is small, then the leader would resort to private rewards (e.g. monopolies, money, etc.) as it is useless to reward those outside the coalition (i.e. the common masses). So, how would the leader get the money? There are 3 ways: taxation, natural resources, and foreign aid). If there are scarce natural resources, then the leader would have no choice but to give the people little freedom in order to make money and allow the government to raise taxes; or the government could beg for foreign aid to reward the essential coalition. If there is an abundance of natural resources, then there is almost no need to listen to the common masses as the revenue from selling the resources should be enough to reward the leader’s coalition.
And this brings us to Myanmar. First of all, we need to bear in mind the ‘resource curse’ in Myanmar. The resource curse is a condition where an abundance of natural resources in a country lead to the country being less democratic, less economic growth, or worse developmental outcomes compared to those with less natural wealth as natural resources allow leaders to accumulate massive wealth to reward their essential coalition without giving the masses many liberties (Smith and Waldner, 2021; de Mesquita and Smith, 2012, p.91). So, how many natural resources are contained beneath Burmese soil? A lot. The most valuable, of course, are the Burmese rubies, jades, and diamonds (Allen and Einzenberger, 2013). Furthermore, there are estimated “2.3 billion barrels of oil, 79.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, and 2.1 billion barrels of natural [sic] gas liquids” in Myanmar (Wandrey et al 2012, p.1). These natural resource deposits would prove to be useful for the junta and its leader — Min Aung Hlaing — to sell the resources and use the money to reward its essential coalition.
How about the size of the junta’s essential coalition? There is no exact number. However, I decided to assume that the size of the essential coalition is the total number of civil servants and the total number of soldiers in the Burmese army. Using that assumption, the size of the junta’s essential coalition would be around 1.7 million people. That is a small number of essential coalitions, as it only made up 3% of the population. As a consequence, the junta would only be required to reward 1,7 million people and this could be accomplished through selling natural resources and, perhaps, foreign aid. How about the rest 52 million people of Myanmar? Who cares? They are not essential to the essential coalition and the leader would always reward the essential coalition first and the general masses second (de Mesquita and Smith 2012, p.101). In short, Min Aung Hlaing’s regime can sustain itself for a long time by rewarding his essential coalition by means of extracting and selling Myanmar’s natural resources without the broad and popular support from the Burmese people.
Perhaps we need to compare the Myanmar junta with the 2011 Arab Spring in Tunisia, which successfully brought down the longtime Tunisian President Zine El Abidin Ben Ali. The difference between Tunisia and Myanmar — as well as the oil-rich Arab states — is clear: Tunisia does not have an abundant natural resource. To raise money for the government, Ben Ali had to rely on taxation and the only way to raise a lot of taxes is to make the people work hard. To make the people work hard, then several freedoms would have to be guaranteed and their demands would have to be listened to. Then, the Tunisian people used the freedoms to organize protests and use their leverage — the taxation — to compel the government to hear their demands. As such, the government would have no way to reward the coalition without listening to the people and President Ali was forced to step down (de Mesquita and Smith 2012, p.272). In Myanmar, it is difficult to see that a Tunisia-style revolution could come. For one, the Burmese people have little leverage over the junta. Secondly, the junta has an abundance of natural resources it could use to reward its essential coalition (as well as material support from Russia and China). In addition, we need to keep in mind that democratic reforms in the 2010s were not the result of a revolution, but because the junta leader, Thein Sein, allow it to happen (Fisher 2016).
Many could argue that the junta would still need to listen to the people as they are required to be put to work in mines and factories. Furthermore, one could argue that public infrastructure would also benefit the junta as their members would benefit from a good education and healthcare, for example. For the former argument, I argue that the number of people that are needed to work in the mines is insignificant. Assuming that there are 500 mines in Myanmar and each employs 100 workers, then there would be 50.000 people who work in the mines, inconsequential given that there are 1.7 million in the essential coalition. Furthermore, if there are absolutely no Burmese willing to work in the mines, the junta could just employ new technologies and import foreign workers. For the latter argument, the junta could just segregate neighborhoods and cities and put the best schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure there only for the benefit of the junta members. In addition, if the push comes to shove, the junta members would have all the resources necessary to receive their education and healthcare abroad.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that the common masses in Myanmar would face a long struggle to achieve democracy in Myanmar. The junta does not need the Burmese people as Myanmar has an abundance of natural resources. Furthermore, the essential coalition that the junta relies on only accounts for 3% of the population. As a consequence, the junta could rule for a long time as there is an abundance of natural resources that could be sold to earn revenue and the essential coalition that needs to be rewarded is small. I do not write this essay to discourage the Burmese people from fighting for their freedom and recommend them to acquiesce to their fates. Instead, I write this essay to inform them of the perilous path and the insurmountable challenges that await the Burmese popular resistance and adjust their strategies accordingly. Can the junta fall? Only time, and the strategies of the Burmese resistance, will tell.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Currency.
Allen, D. and Einzenberger, R. (2013). Myanmar’s Natural Resources: Blessing or Curse? [online] Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Available at: https://www.boell.de/en/2013/12/11/myanmars-natural-resources-blessing-or-curse#:~:text=Today%2C%20Myanmar [Accessed 28 Jul. 2021].
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (n.d.). ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATION FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS (BURMA). [online] AAPP | Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Available at: https://aappb.org/ [Accessed 27 Jul. 2021].
Bociaga, R. (2021). Life in Hiding: Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/life-in-hiding-myanmars-civil-disobedience-movement/ [Accessed 27 Jul. 2021].
de Mesquita, B.B. and Smith, A. (2012). The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. New York: Public affairs.
Fisher, J. (2016). Myanmar: Thein Sein leaves legacy of reform. BBC News. [online] 29 Mar. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35916555 [Accessed 28 Jul. 2021].
Hook, D., Than, T.M. and Ninh, K.N.B. (2015). Conceptualizing Public Sector Reform in Myanmar. [online] San Francisco: The Asia Foundation. Available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Conceptualizing-Public-Sector-Reform-in-Myanmar_Policy-Brief_ENG.pdf [Accessed 28 Jul. 2021].
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2014). The Military Balance 2014. London: Routledge.
Myint-U, T. (2021). Myanmar’s Coming Revolution: What Will Emerge from Collapse? Foreign Affairs, 100(4), pp.132–145.
Smith, B. and Waldner, D. (2021). Rethinking the Resource Curse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wandrey, C.J., Schenk, C.J., Klett, T.R., Brownfield, M.E., Charpentier, R.R., Cook, T.A., Pollastro, R.M. and Tennyson, M.E. (2012). Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas resources of the Central Burma Basin and the Irrawaddy-Andaman and Indo-Burman Geologic Provinces, Myanmar. [online] United States Geological Survey. Washington DC: United States Geological Survey. Available at: https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/fs20123107 [Accessed 28 Jul. 2021].
