A Destiny Above and Beyond: The Question of ASEAN Space Cooperation

Oleh: Shafa Amani Anargya Pragiwaka

As Neil Armstrong took his first steps on the Moon, proclaiming its significance for mankind, the world of multilateral cooperation leapt with him. Space development within the frame of international relations, as expounded by Roberts (1988), concerns the “exploration and exploitation of space for social, political, economic, and military purposes” which are delineated to alter certain aspects of inter-statehood. In 2020, the “global space economy” is worth 447 billion USD — pinpointing it at its peak (Space Foundation, 2021). With China, Russia, and the United States holding primacy over the circuit (Nelson, 2017), it is inevitable to lament over the predictability surrounding states’ economic and political hegemony; surely, when you have got the ground to a pat, it makes sense to rule in the sky too. Then, where does that leave ASEAN — poised as an anticipated rising economy ranked fifth worldwide and valued at 3.2 trillion USD in 2019 (Hapsoro, 2021)? Furthermore, how probable is space exploration when concentrated and acted out by ASEAN?

Since its conception in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has championed a collegial take to regional policy — particularly salient in fortifying its members’ sprouting economies (Maizland & Albert, 2020). Despite optimistic prospects in innovation and research vis-a-vis its collaborative policies, ASEAN has yet to make a united effort to bridge the Global South-North space technology gap (Wang & Chien, 2007; Dobrzanski & Bobowski, 2020). This is not synonymous with a complete absence of any individual plight, as member states have sought space technology to aid in disaster mitigation, such as the prediction of volcanic cycles (Kaku, 2019), a conundrum the naturally tumultuous Southeast Asian region is no stranger to (Pennington, 2020).

Insofar, Indonesia sits atop the space development hierarchy with the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN) which was established in 1962 and launched its first independent satellite in 1976 (the Palapa-1A), making it the oldest and most “settled” programme followed by Thailand and Malaysia’s GISTDA and ANGKASA facilities founded in 2000 and 2002 respectively (Sarma, 2019). Unlike Washington’s NASA or Beijing’s CMSA, space probing for ASEAN nations does not entail the advancement of breakthrough astronomic understandings but rather circles around the patching of existing, age-old issues most notably by monitoring unprecedented weather patterns to alleviate typhoon-tracking, the prediction of maximum crop yields, and optimal seasonal water flowage (Conklin, 2020).

In retrospect, Southeast Asia’s initiatives project relatively embryonic visions to forerunning rocket take-offs and grandiose space stations — yet it exists nonetheless, and is an overlooked vessel of massive potential that could only be further realized if member states were to actively utilize ASEAN as a cooperative medium of collective analysis and betterment.

First, ASEAN — as a functional entity — is already equipped with the necessary working mechanisms to foster a collaborative space-based facility, organization, or simply an intensification of ASEAN-exclusive schemes. As explored by Noichim (2008), ASEAN’s status quo management structure (consisting of a de facto Secretariat that oversees recurring summits, ministerial meetings, and specialized committees such as the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre [ASMC]) has proven sufficient in constructing consensus amongst members despite cultural, economic, technological, and historical discrepancies — vying as an “architect” of regionalism and regional development (Parks et al., 2018) that has generally delivered progressively beneficial and efficient regional policies.

An output of said processes comes within the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which aims to guarantee even and quintessential market competition by lifting certain tariffs (Hiratsuka et al., 2009), has increased the volume of members’ bilateral export relations since its signatory in 1992, such is seen in Indonesia’s agricultural sector (Hapsari & Mangunsong, 2006; Akhmadi, 2017). Albeit operating in fields poles apart, the AFTA may serve as concrete initial proof of ASEAN’s capacity in multi-national governing — such is needed at a larger scale were a space program to make its way into the regional developmental agenda.

Researchers, such as expounded by Tan (2004) regard the conceptualization of AFTA as a double-edged sword. Whereas the above consensus signifies Ground Zero for the previously respective state-centric regional mechanism to partially embrace its identity as a collective cooperation, the Bali Concord II seems to have invigorated a sense of community that appoints the experimentation of policy-centric betterment that may also be open to regular periodic programme management — yet another element an up integrated body critically needs. On the other hand, experts may see the current primacy of AFTA, within the ASEAN superstructure, as a definitive mapping to its future trajectories — solely focusing on minimally integrated groundwork. Nonetheless, Tan posits, we must not completely decimate the plausibilities of the prior notion as its penultimate result, what with contemporary globalism and global state relations intricately woven with the fortification of multilateral political strategy — in short, as the world pushes for togetherness, then so will ASEAN follow suit.

Additionally, Noichim (2008) asserted that the ASEAN Charter, Socio-Cultural Community, Security Community, and Economic Community may pave leeways for large space-specific sub-bodies or perhaps an enlargement of the antecedent SCOSA (Sub-Committee on Space Technology and Applications) which currently focuses on barebones capacity-building in geoinformatics under the chairmanship of Thailand (ASEAN Science & Technology Network, 2021). The European Space Agency (ESA) is one such example and possible imagining of ASEAN’s own Space Institute, as ESA is arguably the most successful torchbearer of regionalism in space exploration propagated in close proximity to the European Union (EU) — with ESA/EU integration gradually ameliorating since December 2016 (ESA, n.d.).

Within the blueprint of ESA, ASEAN seems adequately well-versed in the policy-making and structural processes as outlined above — already securing a “unified” front and amicable disposition from its sourcing-output activity pipeline. What may pose a dilemma for ASEAN to entertain the possibilities of an integrated programme, however, is the lack of known institutional projects that require the level of joint financial cohesion seen in the ESA. Apart from the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund rooted in coalition with the Asian Development Bank (ADB); targeted in the financing of critical infrastructure development plans (ADB, 2020), the ASEAN Fund (established in 1994) is perhaps the sole makeshift funding pool wherein member states contribute 1 million USD upon initiation as a sign of concession (Konstadakopulos, 2002) yet has gone somewhat unremarkable in terms of contemporary usage.

To initially instigate the seedlings of a joint Space Institute, ASEAN must escalate its integration agenda by diving into financial interdependence talks — ensuring the all-in and sustainable participation of members in building mutually beneficial yet collegial correspondences which goes beyond its present tendency for limited socio-political integration (Kim, 2011) but plays into the ideal, yet attainable models for regional cooperation as observed in the EU. Nevertheless, the stepping stones are identifiable and have set the stage satisfactorily; the willingness of state actors up in the air.

Secondly, space research and technology is an arguably isolated sector relatively separated by modern socio-politics and global economics. In its disarray, one may also delineate that the politics of space cooperation prioritizes functionality on top of conflicting agendas (Sheehan, 2007; Rendleman & Faulconer, 2010). Thus, constituting a paradigmatic arena for supra-regional or inter-state dealings. Paradoxically, one may note of the “absence” or supersedence space cooperation has wielded over conventional country blocs and alignments. Despite historically frosty Moscow-Washington political discord, both states have enjoyed lengthy dependence and collaboration agreements since the conclusion of the Cold War — having tied within a space cooperation plan, particularly concerning the International Space Station, to end in 2030 (Luxmoore, 2021). Curiously, such an arrangement has also flown past the international community’s fervent calls for Russian sanctioning following its violent invasion of Ukraine. In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NASA — backed by its national administration — maintained joint operations with Russia’s Roscosmos; citing NASA’s associate administrator Katy Lueders, “[…] both sides always operated professionally and […] continue to have peaceful relations between the two countries in space” (cited Davenport, 2022).

Yet such a phenomenon is not exclusive to historically-heavy nations, more so available through the object of cooperation itself. Another example of successful cooperation despite polarizing circumstances is between Latin American countries and China, having fostered a formidable space partnership miles apart. Moreover, both parties, despite far-off spatial juxtapositions and unorthodox mainstream political allyship, manifested conspicuously in the use of Chinese satellite technology to monitor South American crop mobility and cargo ship navigation, amongst others (Klinger, 2018). Some scholars attribute this to a kindred in the South-South identity and past of economic subjugation, whilst others may pinpoint the contemporary augmentation of BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) standing of the global power spectrum (Ferchen, 2011; Bernal-Meza, 2016). Nonetheless its reasoning, Chinese-Latin American interdependence — amalgamated within space research — is prophesied to intensify in tandem with China’s increasingly open invitations for economic symbiosis (Jenkins, 2012).

After observing the foregoing instances, the margin of triumph rings true. Who can say (or limit) the scope of which ASEAN may encounter when it sets the objective for similar heights; and even more so when internal efforts have been made virtually united with a prior operational association? As a symptom of its less-than-peaceful encounters with overbearing actor interjection following European and Japanese colonialism, alongside getting caught in the tides of Great Power politics even after national independence, ASEAN espouses the neutrality principle in international bloc dialogue within its core and captured in the 1971 ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality) Declaration (Emmers, 2018). The transcendence of a certain state’s domestic rationale upon the space circuit, accessorized by ASEAN’s “non-alignment” principle, could reveal further nuances and new diplomatic dynamics to external partnerships commemoratory of US-Russia and Latin America-China.

This hypothesis may seem more enticing when one considers the abundance of benefits that could be mushroomed from diversified cooperation vehicles. Bronitowski et al. (2006) has highlighted many including the cutting of domestic costs for space advancement, intensifying political sustainability, and refining the “diplomatic prestige” of all actors involved.

Lastly, we shall jog back to the bridging of developed-developing incongruence. Considering the rudimentary status of an integrated ASEAN space programme, such a proposal — optimistic of its success — can also be seen as a “key” to near the heightened degrees of present institutes fostered in the Global North. Considering the relentless and blooming efforts propagated by ASEAN states individually, cooperation could become a catalyst for development; swiftly covering pertinent geographical essentials and initiating the inquiry of scientific discovery whilst sufficiently operating as an impenetrable research facility of its own.

Rafikasari et al. (2020) explore this ravine further by embracing the regular scholarly counsel of amplified regionalism to further the “ASEAN identity” as a symbol of pride, thus resonating deeper in member states which may cajole them into perceiving each other with a conflated sense of “brotherhood” — transforming ASEAN’s cooperation dynamics from individual growth stipulated in unity, to a notion building towards regional strength. Additionally, a joint space institution could also preserve the monetary funds states have located respectively and turn it into a form of “teamwork” that could achieve exceeding results for less the personal price to pay. Not only would such a scheme cut advancement time by increasing manpower practically, but it also ensures a “best-of-the-best” research personnel pool as it concerns multiple, vastly differing states rather than occupational candidates originating from a more homogenous national milieu.

In conclusion, ASEAN should consider further the prospects of a collective space entity, akin to that of the ESA, as it may reap significant profits in an array of configurations. First, an ASEAN space institute can already be facilitated and is feasible to stand upon the pre-existing roots of the aforementioned regional body today, particularly observable through its existing join initiatives (such as AFTA) and centralized sub-bodies. Next, we glance at the field of space cooperation itself — relatively above “earthly” political and economic friction — as a medium for favourable inter-state dealings, which offers new and prospective diplomatic interest. Finally, it may hold primacy in the conundrum of space disparity between international superpowers and their deficient counterparts, namely ASEAN as an identified entity of proportionately triumphant Global South collaboration. When Armstrong took a giant leap for mankind, he might have widened socio-political and economic gaps to larger lengths. Yet, who is to say Southeast Asia could not be caught up in speed despite feeble starting points? History is open for rebuttal, and as Astronomist Edwin Hubble says: “the history of astronomy is a history of receding horizons”.

Shafa Amani Anargya Pragiwaka is a staff at the Event and Program Division at FPCI UGM. This article reflects her own views and not necessarily those of FPCI UGM

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